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.ht its meeting on  8  May  1975,  the Group  HJ.griclG.turen  agreed that for grains 
a  multilateral solution shouJ.d  be  negotiated in this Sub-Group in order to settle 
all the  elements of the problems  relevrut to trade in this sector. 
The  Com::1.uni tj' believes  that a  solution consisting of forr:rulati.'1g  2.11d  concluding 
an International Lgreement  on  Grains  might  be  the  ans1..rer  to all the  f\mdar:~ental 
problems  that arise. 
The  purpose  of this  statement  ~s to  8}.'})laiJ.J.  the  deta~~..ls of t:his  Coramunity 
approac.h  and  to determine  what  are the fundamental  elenents on  which  the negotiations 
should bear. 
Ir,st&ti~, ai:i  pc.r3 [,  and recent trends in t11e  market i'or  gr&ins  shoH, is the 
ma.)or  probJ.cn  fncing  trt.:de  in these pr-od'..lcts,;  and for  a  prod:lct  sector of  s-u.ch 
irrlportonce  for the  security of tho 1,rorld 1s  food  supply,  this instability has 
hurmful  repercussions not only on  the  conditions  goverYJ.ing  trc..dc  c..1.1d  tho level of 
t2:~~dc,  tut C.ilso  on  tb.e  SiJ~lJPl:r of·  food.  tf'.~.e  cconcr.ticr.~.l"lv  lnnst~  8.dvc.nc.e.~~t  r_:.o,Jnti~ies 
br::in~  tho ones  lilost  affected by  thcL  s:i tuation.  v 
1·Jith  this in nj.11d,  t!\e  GornrrnJnit~r  corl('eived the idea of  nn  n.pprr;~ic~}l  t0  thG 
negot:l.ations  calculated to promote  internation2.l action in respect of  same  of'  the 
causes underlyir::.g  t:bJ..s  instc.bili  ty. 
The  root 
demand,  sincG 
exporting  o.nd 
fluctuations. 
co.use  is a  lack of adaptability in the  trend of supply in relation to 
the vagnries of climate  expose  the production of nany countries, 
lit~orting colhJ.tries  alike,  to unforeseeable  and uncontrollahla 
The  resulting uncertainty regarding availability,  conditions of 
r  . 
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supply and outlets makes  for the adoption of'  domestic production policies which 
over-react to Darket conditions  and m.ore  often than not are til.:.  timed in thci  r 
effect., 
· These policies have often been  accused of belng n_destabilizing11  factors which 
upset  the  grci.ns He.rket  -·  hence  the desire expressed in certain quarters for the 
abolition of these policies and  the  complete libernlization'of accesso  Tho 
inste.bili  ty of tho me:x·k.-::t  may  Hell have  been  e.ccontuated by the  so policies, 
whether practiced by :i.llTporting or by exporting cow1tries,  and there is no  doubt 
that lack of co-o:::·din:;.ticn  bot-v:oen  the various  ir"itio.tives  taken  by governr;1ents 
has  been  an  aggravating factor  4.n  this instability. 
But efforts to  rGinove  tc,riff  t::.nd  :r.o:r1--tarif'f  barriers '\.Jould  inevitably 
clash Hith the need felt by govermaents  to.· apply a  d.o:westic  policy protectjng 
the producer from  this instability nnd a1lmdng them  to  ensure  a  certain level 
of self--sufficiencyo  · 
vJhat is more,  such domestic policies are not  the  cause of the instability, 
which has its roots  rather in the  chronic natural lack of adaptability of 
supply and  denandc  During the  sixties it might have  been  thought that this 
lack Has  simply and solely the outcone,  in a  period favoure.ble  to  the  groHth 
of productivity,  of  gi-~.ring undue  encourngenent  to. relatively inefficient 
productioEo  Developncnts  since 1972  have  t.endcd to modify thc::.t  vievla  It has 
transpired that fluctuations  i..11  prod,~ction cou1d be  such  as  to render it 
incapo.ble of  copinr:;  ·Hi th increased demm1d,  chroncloe:;ico.lly end geogrE'.pJ:'I.ically. 
The  persistence over the years 1972-1974 of  a  situation of relative inadequacy 
of supply in relation to dewmd,  in spite of increased acreage,  has  brought 
about  o.  drastic fallint;--off  in stocks,  a.."1.d  the rl''lfcmlting  price trend hns  rande 
it clear that in such  circur1stances  the significance of price variations in 
relation vri th the rel[:tive vt::.riations  of  supply end  d.r.;mand  was  increasinr; 
spectacularly.,  Hhat  seems  to be in the offing on  the  eve  of the 1975-19?6 
C:L"'p  yeo.r:  V!hcm  production  prordsfl::J  to  be  ex~e.rt3.onaJ;  r1ni..flts  tn  thA  ~r>me. 
indication of  an u.nstable mo.rket. 
The  tmstained rnte of  c;rm1th  of production ;,ms  only achieved as  o.  result 
of the intensified use of  [~V!J.ilablo  resources~  In  addition to higher production 
costs~  :Ln;_-;2-:e:.:.s.:;cl  ·~nD.llE:l~e:.1;i  l-1  t~y- of  ag:cie;tll tu  .. cal J?.r:vclu.u L.icr1  Lo  L~ne  v~-1garies of 
cli1:1o.te  is  prob;;~bly also involved,  together with  a  mo1'e  r:1arked  depend<:mce  of 
ths grains production sector on  variation.s  i..r1  factors  alien to agriculture  -
includL""Ig  cncrgJ~ rc0curces  an.d  generz~l e.-:onoir.ic  pl1e110L1e11a  s~u.ch  as  illi.latiur.l  •. 
Jill this m.r±es  it Hore  difficult then ever to forecast future  trends of the 
gro.ins narket,  and the present situation reveo.ls  in o.ccentuated form  the 
phcnonenon of instability on the 1vorld no.rket for  grni..11s  a..11d  :increo.sed risk 
for the future of a  situation of alternating shortage  and surplus. 
r· 
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Since this alteration of shortage and  surplus  on  the world narket is a  factor 
11.aking  for prot ectionisn  ( economc  groupings  or countries where  production is 
Bo·st  stc.ble naturally try to avoid inporting any instability prRvalent  on  the 
world lJarkets)  everything suggests that  an improveoent  in the stability and 
security of the market  will help the policies followed by trading partners to be 
focussed raore  on  expanding trade and to consider the interest of seeking the 
advantages inherent in such  expansion. 
The  Corn:raunity  stated at the first meeting of the Group '!Agriculture!' that it 
proposed,  in the light of this situation, that  an  international agreenent  be 
negotiated,  in other words that  a  framework  be  set  up vithin w:b.ich  colJil:i.tments 
wou~d be  carried out  concerning  a  price discipline backed up by concerted national 
policies  on  stocks.  It also intinated that it VIas  ready to participate:: in such 
an  agree:10nt,  an  offer which it regarded as meaningful for the objecti  v.es  of the 
negotiations in this seetor as -\.,rell  as  a  positive contribution to the type of 
action to be taken for the security of the -vmrld 1 s  food  supply. 
The  type of International Agreenent  on  Grains that the Conmunity proposes 
would  conprise three  elements~ 
(a)  Strengthening of machinery for the  exchange of information on 
market  pl'Ospocts  and production policies; 
(b)  Setting up of stabilization nechanisms  calculated both to stabilize the 
int8rnational grains  ::~arket  in terr:ls  of price and  supply levels in a 
r.1anner  acceptable to ir:;porters  and  exporters alike 1  and to isolate t.hat 
1:-JUrket  frau any destabilizing factors that night  e!':l.erge  in dm!lestic 
Etark.;:;ts; 
(c)  Ii.-proveE•;)nt  of the situation of d·::;veloping  countries,  in particular by 
reorganization of the food  aid structure. 
A.d  (a)  £;xchnncs  of inforrlstion 
It is indispensable for the proper functioning of the proposed Agreement 
tf.t<-~.1:  "the  part.ies to it  ur1dertal~e:  on  n  p;;r1·~~r;n(;-nt  b.s.si  ~;  thr:  T'11}t1J:J.1  c~rh.::?.DG~  o_f 
inforr:.·ation  on their production,  consmuption,  coi:llJ.ercial  and non-comraercial 
exchanges,  so that  at all tines there is an  adequate basis for the decisions to 
he  r.tEtde  ,_,_n_der  the  .f\  ... gl"S'3T:.lent.  ~J.  pcrr.ru~cr~t  crgun  3hollld  'be  set  up  for tbis 
purpose to ensure the  sound  nanagencnt  of the Agree'!ilent.  This  systematic  exchange 
of inforr.ation,  coupled vTith  the rnachinery of the Agreement,  should make  for 
improvement  in the orientation of policies in the grains sector. MTN/GR/vJ/1 
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Market  ~:., cabilizc.tion should be  ::;,:mght  s:imultcmeous..:..y  by settj.ng up  a minimum 
and maximum  safeguard price mechanism  and by putting into operation an 
international stock-keeping policy. 
1.  To  ensure  that the trend of market prices remains  within reasonable limits 
at any rate,  minimun  &'1d  max:L'TIU.'n  safeguard prices  should be negotiated 
determining a  fixed rane;e  and involving at those levels preferential commitments 
to buy and sell v!hich  l·rould  safe::;J.o.rd  exportine end .inporting members  in 
situations of surplus  and of shortage,  This price range,  corresponding to the 
most  extreme price situntions,  should bo  sufficiently ,,fide,;since its purpose 
is not to  impose  o.  rigid p~:ice structure on  the >·mrld market.  Experience 
has  sho\,.r:n  that such  a  stru.ctm·e  c2n  eo.sily be  sHept  m-1ay  by circumstances. 
Nor  shou..ld  the price range  be  too  rig_i.dly predetermined;  it could be  the 
subject of revision :i.n  relation 1.-::ith  long-term market prospects on the basis 
of criteria laid do·..rn  in the l:..greer:1ent  itself  o 
The  cor;rr.dtTients  that mit;ht  be  lin_l;:ed  with the  extreme  situations Hould  be 
the follmvinc: 
- vrnen  Hor  ld ma::'l<::et  prices  reach(3d the rrurn.mu.rn  level  of the price range, 
.importine mor1bors  ,,-ould  U..'1d8l·take  to give priority jn purchasing supplies to 
exporting riler:lbers  Fhj_c-1:1.  for their po.rt  would obse::'ve  that·  price in all their 
sales  and undert<.l;:e  in pa:;.·ti..e;ular  not to  sell on nt:)re  favourable  terms  to 
non-member  countries~ 
- \<Then  -vmrld  :markot prices reached the me.ximum  level of the price range, 
exporting members  -v;ould  Ut1dertake  to give priority ::..n  supplying to importing 
members  at the  :C:il:Y~iT:_:·,::t  "J:•i::;e  ls,'cl for their traditional import  volumes. 
2.  In order·  to  actack the roots of ..:..nstabj.li ty of the market i.e. the short-
term imba.l.mce  betMcon  SU)JpJ.y  i.:md  dom:md,  a  s;:s:mc~_rt_~q__stoc;)s.-keeping__IJ_2lic;y:  ~<rould 
have to  be  establi;-3hcd  so  2s  to  influe:1ce  -~he  7olurae of supply on  the market. 
IL  vroulcl be agreer:l  that 
\-lOuld  build up  and mainto.:i.n 
level of  course  bo:l.ng  set~ 
menber  cmmt:;_~ios,  exporte-rs  Rnrl  i mporto:rl'l  A.J ike; 
surh vclm:1o  of'  stocks  as  Has  necessary,  a  maximum 
The  po.rtios  to  U.o  li.c;reement  HouJ.d  undertake to 
tnana.p;e  t}JGse  s~i:.oc~:s  Dl~  tb.s  ~~r2sis  c.f  :::ules  a:J.c~  c1·i.te~:"'i:1  in.C01J?Orntcd in j_t:  x~d 
all the various  eJ.eme.:1ts  (vo11.'me,  clis!-or:i.butior..~  criteria etco)  would be  the 
subject of  negot:i.atim~. 
Decisions on  stoc:t5ng and destocking  operat:~ons Hould be  made  in the light 
of the market si  tuo.t5.on  <mel  would  oo  implemented by the individual parties to  the 
Agreement in respect  o:C  the  stocks held o.r  to  be built up  by each of them in 
pursu~:mce of tbe  A[;roencmt.  One  of the objective criteria for setting in r:1otion 
concerC.ed  stocking or des tocldng opero.tions  uou.ld  be prices on the world market. . MTN/GR/H/1 
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For this purpose it would  be  stipulated in the  Agreement  that when  prices 
reached a  certain level to  be  determined in relation vJith  and  within the limits 
of the price range,  stockin~ or destocking  would  be  carried out, it bein~ 
understood that the  amount  involved in these operations would  be ·determined on 
the basis of  consultation within the framework  of the Agreement,  acco1.ll1t  being 
taken of other elements representative of the market  situation. 
3.  In the  Co:mmunity 1s  judgement,  these price and  stock-keeping mechanisms  as  a 
whole,  and  the commitments  they involve,  vmuld  make  it possible to achieve an 
equitable reciprocity bet;,.reen  importing and  exporting countries.  Such an 
Agreement  '\·!Ould  constitute a  lasting international framework for entering into 
commitments  and implementing  them.  It 1-1ot1ld  also provide the  nee es  sary flexi--
bility to  allo1~ the essential mechanisms  and  elGments  of the  system to  be 
adapted to market  circumstances. 
Ad  (c)  ImnroY:_~~nt of the  situation o£:.developing  co1.ll1trie~ 
it should be  noted that the stabilization and expansion of markets will 
benefit first and foremost  the  developing  countries.  Indeed,  past  experience has 
shoHrr that the repercussions of free  trade  on  markets  subject to  such drastic 
laws are  even more  difficult to  cope  with for countries facing problems  of 
econord.c  development.  The  protection of outlets and  supplies that would  be 
provided by  the International !l.greement  on Grains  proposed by the  Community  1..rould 
therefore be  particularly beneficial to developing countries.  Exporting countries 
would find themselves  safeguarded by the  stabilizing mochaniomo  involved a.gainst 
a  fall in their export  earnings.  In addition,  for the benefit of developing 
coU-.'1tries  I·Jhich  are importers,  the Community  feels that the proposed Agreement 
should be  accompanied by  arrangements for food aid in line with the resolutions 
adopted at the vJorld  Food  Conference. 
In presenting this outline of'  an International  Agreelllent  on Grains,  the 
Corrununi t.v  believes it is putting fonmrd a  solution encompassing all the 
problems  that arise in regard to  trc:..de  in grains,  inasmuch as  ~lj  provides  an 
answer  to  the  fundamental  question of supplies and outlets as well as the 
c;onrii+.j.ons  :i  .. n  1-1hir.h  trade  -Lakes  place. 
In setting up  mechanisms  creating the conditions for achieving  a  better 
Prmi 1 i hri  nm  in t.hP.  m·~i  n.01  mRY'!u~t.  t.ri t.hrmt  i nt.ronucinfl'  a  rifl'id  svstem which  I.Jould  --)_----·-·  ----~-- ----- .  ---- o-- ------- ----·------ ··- .  ·-.  ·- ..,_;  ,_,  "' 
arbitrarily distort the free play of the market,  an International Agreement  on 
Grains  uould lead to  a  regularization of the market  avoiding recourse to  export 
measures likely to disrupt it thrvugh abuse of competition.  In the  same  Hay,  the 
machinery '\·Jould  help to avoid  recom~se to drastic import or even export 
protection measures. lon'N/GR/H/1 
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l:Ioreover,  a  decisive factor for tho  expansion of trade Hhich the International 
Agreement  brings into play in an  indirect  way,  ~:md  which  can  only be realistically 
approachc)d in this way,  is production policy.  The  stabilization mechanisLJ.S  as 
envisag.:;d  by the  Co~::.::un.ity  etr8  in fact  nom1s  of influencing the behaviour of 
goverw'":lc:nts  in this  r.:atter~ · 
.  The  fact that the CoT:J.mnity  is proposing  an International Agreenent  on  Grains 
and  certn:iiJ.  other products  - neans that it rE:gards these sectors  and the nature of 
these products as  sufficiently important to vJarrant  a  solution irJ.plying  a  high 
degree  of international co-operation bee.ring on all the elenents of the problc:;n. 
Great  hopes  have been  staked on  the success of the r.mltilateral trade 
negotiations  as ·Hell  as  on  internation2..l  co--operation to inprove th•3  food 
situation.  To  r<:;spond  to these hopes,  the  Conr::.unity  has tried to prssEmt  a 
negotiating approach which it believus to be realistic and  r.teaningful.  The 
Connunity for its port is ready to enter into cor:rr:Utr,lcmts  in respect  of the 
olenents of this proposal to th0ir full extent,  m1d  it subnits thor:1  for your 
consideration and  exa::.:tination,  since in the finaJ.  analysis it is this Sub-Group 
on  Grains that  has  responsibility for  conducting thG  negotiations in this sector. La  premiere  reunion  du  sous-groupe  ''cereaLos••a commence  sos 
travaux  hier,  Lund1,  a  10  h  30.  ce  sous-groupe  a  ete  1nst1tue 
Lars  de  La  reunion  du  8  mai  du  groupe  ''agricuLture•t. 
JUN  2 -197~ 
dans  sa  decLaration  Liminaire  comme  porte-paroLe  de  La  communaute, 
Le  representant  de  La  commission  (m.  pizzutt1)  a  rappeLe  que  Le 
groupe  de  L'agr1cuLture  eiait convenu  que  pour  Les  cereaLes  une 
soLution  muLtiLateraLe  devait etre  negociee  au  sein  de  ce  sous-
groupe  afin de  regLer  tous  Les  elements  des  probLemas  afferant 
au  commerce  de  ce  secteur.  a  cette  fin,  La  communaute  pense  que 
L'eLaboration  d'un accord  internationaL  sur  Les  cereaLes serait 
La  meiLLeure  solution  : 
''Le  type  d'accord  internationaL  sur  L.es  cereaLes  que  propose  La 
communaute  comporterait  trois eLements  : 
~  a)  Le  renforcement  des  mecanismes  d'echanges  d'irtformatidn  sur 
.II 
~  Les  perspectives  de  marche  et  Les  poLitiques  de  production. 1 
; 't  ~t 
·, 
b)  La  mise  en  pLace  de  mecanismes  de  stabiLisation  tendant  d'une 
part  a  stabiLiser  Le  marche  internationaL  des  cereaLes  du  point 
de  vue  niveau  des  prix et niveau  de  L'offre  de  facon  acceptabLe 
pour  Les  importateurs  comme  pour  Les  exportateurs,  d'autre  part 
a  1soLer  ce  marche  des  facteurs  destabiLisants qui  pourraient 
apparaitre  sur  Les  marches  internes., 
c)  L'ameL1orat1on  de  La  situat1ori·~es pays  en  voie  de  developpement 
notamment  par  La  reorganisation  de  La  structure  de  L'a1de 
aL1menta1re. •' 
en  ce  qui  concerne  La  ~tab1L1sat1on ~es marches,  Le~representant 
cte  La  commission  a  precise  ses  idees  de .t:a  facon  suivante  : 
''pour  garant1r  que  Le  developpement  des  prix  du  marche  restera 
en  tout  cas  dans  des  l1m1tes raisonnabLes,  des  prix  minimum  et 
~ax1mum de  sauvegarde  devraient etre  negoc1es  deL1m1tant  une 
fourchette  de  prix et comportant  a  Leur  n1veau  des  engagements 
preferentieLs d'achats et de  ventes  garantissant  Les  rnembres 
cxportateurs et 1mportateurs dans  Les  deux  situations d'excedents 
. et  de  penurie.  cette  fourchette  de  prix,  corresp.ondant  a  des 
situations vraiment  extremes  de  prix,  devrait.etre  suffisamment 
Large,  Le  but  n'etant  pas  d'imposer  une  structure  de  prix rigide 
sur  Le  marche,  L'exper1ance  ayant  demontre  Qu'un  teL  dispositif 
peut  etre  faciLemen~ bataye  par  les circonstances.  cette  fourchette 
I.  .._., 
de  prix  ne  devrait  pas  non  plus avoir  un  caractere  trop rigidement 
..  • ... 
predetermine~ •.  eLL~ pourrait done  etre .rev1~abL& en  fonction  des 
persPtlCt~VGs·.a  '~ong  tef"'~G  PU' mar.che ;Ei:Jr  bast); dd'·;cri ~e'res, pre..-
b~  ....  :.~~~4ir~::.: "\?" :ta::~~·,~}.];·;fE~e8r?..r~;~~;;,~~·;;  ¥l:T:~·~ '~:~i"tk·!'_j~= ~1~:  i;::: · ·  ,. !·.  ·  ..  · ·  '·· · 
,,. 
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''afin d'agir  sur  L'orig1ne  de  L'instab1Lite  du  marche,  c'est-a-
eire  S11r  te  desequiLibre  a  court  terme  entre· L  'offre et  La  demande, 
une  poLitique  concertee  de  stockage  devrait etre  mise  en  oeuvre 
de  maniere  a  infLuencer  Le  voLume  de  L'offre  sur  Le  marche. 
1L  serait convenu  que  Les  pays  membres,  Les  exportateurs  comme  Les 
importateurs,  constituent et conservent  pour  autant  que  de  besoin 
un  voLume  de  stocks  auqueL  iL  .sera1t  natureLLeMent  fixe  un 
maximum.  Les  participants devraient  s'engager  a  Le  gerer  sur  base 
de  regLes et  de  criteres inscrits dans  L'accord,  taus  ces  eLements 
(voLume- repartition,  criteres ••• )  davant  etre negocies. 
Les  decisions d'operations  de  stockage  et de  destockage  seraient 
prises en  fonction  de  La  situation du  marche  et reaLisees  par  Les 
membres  de  L'accord  sur  Le  stock  dent  1Ls  seraient  detenteurs 
ou  qu'iLs devraient constituer au  titre  de  L'accord.  un  des 
criteres object1fs de  decLenchement  des  actions concertees  de 
stockage  ou  de  destockage  serait  Les  prix  sur  Le  marche  internationaL 
iL  serait a  cet effet  prevu  dans  L'accord  que,  Lorsque  Les  prix 
atteignent  un  niveau  de  prix  a  determiner  en  reLation  avec  Les 
Limites  de  La  fourchette eta L'interieur de  ceLLe-c1,  des  opera-
tions  de  stockage  ou  de  destockage  devraie~t avoir  Lieu,  etant 
entendu  que  Le  montant  de  ces operations devrait etre  determine 
par  consuLtation dans  Le  cadre  de  L'accord  en  prenant  en  consi-
deration d'autres eLements  representatifs  de  La  situation du 
rr.arche. '' 
dans  ses conclusions,  Le  representant  de  La  commission  a  notammcnt 
decLare  : 
''en outre,  il est  un  facteur  determinant  pour  L'expansion  des 
cchanges  que  L'accord  internationaL  met.en  jeu  de  facon  1nd1rccte 
et  qui  peut  seuLement  etre  aborde  par  ce  biais si  L'on  veut etre 
reaListe,  c•est  La  poLitique  de  production.  Les  mecanismes  de 
stabiLisation  teLs  que  La  communaute  Les  envisage  sont  en  fait 
des  moyens  d'infLuencer  Lecomportement  des  gouvernements  en 
La  matiere. 
de  L'avis  de  La  communaute,  pour  toutes ces raisons,  c'est dans 
Le  cadre  de  ces negociations  muLtiLateraLes,  et au  sein  de  ce 
sous-groupe  ,  que  doivent etre  jetees  Les  bases  d'un  teL  accord.'' 
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